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OF CLAIMING THE LAW: THE DISTRESS OF THE
WANDERER
TRISHA OLSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
I was pleased to be asked to join Margins' symposium today.
My task is to provide an historical context that, hopefully, will
highlight the novelty of the question we address today: to what degree,
if any, is it permissible for moral or (more narrowly) religious beliefs
to provide the justification for, or content of, our laws? I want to
suggest that this question would have been unintelligible for most of
the period that we call the western legal tradition. After making this
argument, I want to turn to the medieval conception of criminal
sanctions as a specific example of how a union between law and
morality found expression.'
Let me begin by clarifying terms. By "the West," I mean the
developing culture of the peoples of Western Europe since the fall of
the Roman Empire and who from the late eleventh to the early
sixteenth century shared a common allegiance to the Roman Catholic
faith.2 By "legal" I mean more than positivist law. Rather, I mean to
refer to Roman-canonical law, royal law, feudal law, and Germanic
folk law as far back as the fourth century.3 By "tradition" I mean our
sense of continuity between past and future-our sense of historical
continuity. 4  Finally, by "criminal law," I mean to reference those
wrongs such as murder, arson, rape, and larceny that by the twelfth
century comprised our common law felonies.
* Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. B.A.,
1988, University of California at Berkeley, J.D., 1991, Yale Law School. I wish to thank my
research assistant Melissa N. Tapp and my colleagues Professors Thomas C. Berg, Andrew
Klein, and George R. Wright for their unflagging support. I also wish to thank my daughter,
Alena Alma Marie.
1. I prefer the word sanction, for punishment holds a particular definition of
sanctioning as the infliction of a suffering (i.e. penalty) upon a wrongdoer. When the meaning
is intended, the word "punishment" will suffice.
2. Within the tradition of legal scholarship, "Western" is separate from Arab and
Byzantine. See HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 2 (1983).
3. See ALAN WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL LAW 1 (1981).
4. See Linda Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1467,
1496 (1996). ("[I]t is also clear that without some common ground, not only law, but
language too would fail. Legal discussions, then, would not be pointless, but simply
impossible. As long as there is something to say, there must be some shared meaning,
however thin or superficial.").
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I begin by suggesting that the question of the relationship
between law and morality presupposes a positivist framework. By
asking what the relationship between law and morality should be, we
assume a distinction between the two. This assumption of a distinction
between law and morality rests with the idea that what makes an
imperative "law" is that it has been posited by a legally constituted
sovereign who holds the power to sanction people within a specific
territorial space.5 Under this vision, "law" can exist without reference
to its content, or without asking whether it is wrong or right (by
whatever measure).6 What I wish to share with you is an older
understanding of law that did not accept or entertain this gap between
law and norms that today's question implicitly adopts.
Note, however, that the reader should not leap to the
conclusion that some form of natural law, or moral realism, is about to
be discussed. This warning seems necessary given the tendency of the
modern jurisprudential literature today to conceive of legal theory as a
tussle between reason and power.7 Thus, those who are not medieval
historians tend to view disagreements about the nature of law as
reducible to a conflict between a universal ideal of natural law, or
enlightenment reason and an historically contingent idea of law that
amounts to the power of given groups at given periods in history. In
the latter case, what makes a given rule a law is the fact that it has
been enacted in a legally identifiable way. In contrast to either theory,
what I wish to share with you today is a conception of law as custom
5. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § § 18, 20 (1st ed.
1834) ("[E]very nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own
territory." It "would be wholly incompatible with the equality and exclusiveness of the
sovereignty of any nation, that other nations should be at liberty to regulate either persons or
things within its territories."); 2 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §
1.6, at 6, § 4.12, at 46. (1935).
6. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 157 (Wilfrid E.
Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832).
7. See Linda Ross Meyer, Between Reason and Power: Experiencing Legal Truth, 67
U. CIN. L. REV. 727, 731-32 (1999) (providing an elegant attempt to resolve the perceived
tension between rhetorical argument and philosophical enquiry). Despite attempts to locate
something between reason and power, the battle lines continue to be drawn in a traditional
manner. See DANIEL A. FARBER AND SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 33 (1997) ("The Enlightenment's goal of an objective
and reasoned basis for knowledge, merit, truth, justice, and the like is an impossibility:
"objectivity," in the sense of standards of judgment that transcend individual perspectives,
does not exist. Reason is just another code word for the views of the privileged. The
Enlightenment itself merely replaced one socially constructed view of reality with another,
mistaking power for knowledge. There is naught but power.").
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and inherited tradition. The period I wish to speak of is roughly from
the seventh to the twelfth century.
A view of law as the volksrecht or volksgeist of a people is
little studied by legal historians today. 9 In jurisprudence, such talk is
not in vogue. Though schools of thought, such as the law and society
movement for example, focus attention upon cultural context and
social immersion when discussing the nature of law, a gap between
"law" and "society" is still presupposed. The questions in this
literature are often not about the nature of law, but about what causes
it.10 In other areas of jurisprudence, the discussion about "what is law"
(particularly in the law school classroom) usually centers upon such
concepts as H.L.A. Hart's "rule of recognition,""I some form of human
rights theory, or ideas of moral realism which posit an objective moral
order that places normative constraints on our daily conduct.' 2 And as
indicated above, in the case of medieval law, legal scholars, (as
opposed to medieval historians), usually find it sufficient to employ
the phrase "natural law" to capture the juridical posture of the middle
8. The name frequently given to this understanding is historicism. See BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 22-23 (1991) (discussing historicism in American jurisprudence);
Harold J. Berman, Towards an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, History, 76 CAL.
L. REv. 779, 789 (1988) (Savigny's relation to American and English jurisprudence). While
in legal scholarship it is commonly associated with such thinkers as Edmund Burke or Karl
Savigny, its ancestry may be traced back to time immemorial.
9. Patrick Wormald rightly* observes that the phrase "heroic code" of a Germanic
peoples, for example, is little used by legal historians today for in the later twentieth century:
"Wagnerian images have acquired unhappy connotations." Patrick Wormald, Anglo Saxon
Society and its Literature in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO OLD ENGLISH LITERATURE 11
(M. Godden & M. Lapidge eds., 1998). Similar skepticism has been envinced in regard to
English common law. The idea of a peculiar "spirit" or Volkgeist at work as the answer to
why English law differed from the continent has been called the kind of appeal that attracted
"nineteenth century romantic scholars" but which is no more than to speak of "souls, channels,
springs, wells, and other deep tides" but is not the doing of good history. See R.C. VAN
CAENEGEM, BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 86, 99 (1973).
10. See Naomi Mezey Out of the Ordinary: Law, Power, Culture and the
Commonplace, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 145 (2001) (review of THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW)
(excellent discussion of tensions in law and society movement between social sciences and
those who find methods of social science as unstable as law itself). But see Jane B. Baron,
Language Matters, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 163 (2000) (noting that law may itself be the
doing of daily life and hence the assumed gap between law and life a mistaken construct).
11. For Hart, "law" proper and the rule of recognition given by secondary rules is
thought to cure the defects of non-legal regimes where custom remains uncertain, static, and
instable. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92-95 (2d ed. 1994).
12. See Jean Porter, From Natural Law to Human Rights: Or Why Rights Talk Matters,
14 J.L. & RELIGION 77 (2000) (for interesting discussion on whether natural law is a necessary
condition of a natural rights theory).
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ages in its entirety.1 3 Steadily overlooked, however, is a conception of
law as unwritten custom and practice where "[t]ruth was not isolable
but fill[ed] the interstices of things."'14 This omission is odd given that
this understanding of law dominated from the fifth century well into
the sixteenth century. In the specific context of those who write on
theories of punishment, the oversight is stranger still for folded into the
medieval knowledge of law as custom and usage was a clear and
undisputed understanding of wrongdoing as a moral offense, and of
the redemptive nature of sanction. These ideas have much to teach
those concerned with alternatives to the retributive or utilitarian model
of punishment.
In Part One I will sketch, the idea and salient attributes of law
as custom. In Part Two, the discussion turns to the question of
"religious values" and the necessity of recasting that question when
one turns to middle ages. Hopefully having set a backdrop, Part Three
will take up the narrower topic of the relationship between medieval
conceptions of sanctioning and penance prior to the twelfth century.
Some comparison will be made with contemporary theories of
punishment in order to highlight those ancient beliefs and aspirations
that remain with us as traces in the air, and those from which we, albeit
at times unconsciously, recoil.
II. PERSONALITY OF LAW AND POSITIVISM
Often the best place to begin is with the familiar. Thus, I start
with a quick thumbnail outline of what most of us understand by the
word "law." Next, we turn to the medieval discussion of law as
custom and to the ways such an understanding of law may continue,
however faintly to resonate.
A. Territoriality and Sovereigns
Many of us are comfortable, or at least familiar, with an
understanding of law that is tied to territoriality, legality, and
sovereignty. The principle of sovereignty is typically ascribed to Jean
Bodin's work Les Six Livres de la Republique in 1576 where he wrote
13. Id. at 82.
14. ROBERT FRASER, THE DARK AGES AND THE AGE OF GOLD 234 (1973).
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that sovereignty was the supreme power over the citizens." This
power was subject to no limitations and could neither be delegated nor
divided. The sovereign alone "makes law for the subject, abrogates
law already made, and amends obsolete law."' 16 Law, then, was the
product of a willing sovereign who was, himself, not constrained by
law. In the nineteenth century, John Austin and Jeremy Bentham
added to Bodin's theory. John Austin declared that law amounts to
those rules a sovereign wills and, most importantly, can enforce
against any individual who may be within his reach (i.e. territory). 17
There is, said Austin, an interdependence between "obligations,"
"coercion," "command," and "sanction." 18  What distinguished
authoritative commands as law was that legal commands are both
accompanied by a sanction and directed toward a general public
group. 9 Central to this understanding of law is that "the authenticity
of a law is a question exterior to, and independent of, that of its
content." 20  H.L.A. Hart expanded upon this thesis, arguing, that
secondary rules-rules of promulgation-enabled a citizenry to
recognize a posited rule as a legally valid norm.21 Accordingly, under
legal positivism, the question arises about whether law's content
should ever be morally grounded and, if so, whose morality should
dominate. The criminal law is not excepted from this debate.
Notwithstanding, that in the area of traditional crimes our intuitive
22judgment is that crimes are morally culpable acts, well respected
scholars argue in the tradition of western liberalism that the purpose of
criminal law should be about preventing identifiable harm and not
about assigning moral culpability.
23
15. JEAN BOD1N, LES Six LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE 10 (1576); JEAN BODIN, ON
SOVEREIGNTY 23, 46 (Julian H. Franklin ed. & trans., 1992) (1583 ed.).
16. On the importance of Bodin, particularly for theories of conflicts of laws, see Hessel
E. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 9, 18 (1966).
17. Austin explained, "[a] command is distinguished from other significations ... by the
power and the purpose of the party commanding to inflict an evil or pain in case the desire be
disregarded." AUSTIN, supra note 6, at 5.
18. Id. at 25.
19. See Anthony Sebok Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054, 2065
(1995) (arguing against perceived tie between legal formalism and positivism).
20. GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 313 (quoting
Bentham Manuscripts in the University College, London Library) (1986).
21. See HART, supra note 11, at 97-107 (defining rules of recognition).
22. See, e.g. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996).
23. See Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193 (1985) (presenting a theory of crime in terms of an intentional bypass of an available
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The positivist's assumption of a conceptual distinction between
law and morality is routine for most academics in one form or the
other. Still, we in the legal community remain (albeit at times
unreflectively) uncomfortable with positivism as a true understanding
of law. We find it unworkable, for example, in the area of conflicts of
law where the idea of the unconstrained sovereign, if taken to the
extreme, would render the burdens, privileges, commitments, and
obligations of citizens liable to constant uncertainty and instability
whenever they traveled across a state line. Think of the simple
problem of enforcing a contract. Comity, the limiting principle in
choice of law, has operated, albeit not explicitly in modem literature,
as a moral barrier to the extreme implications of classic positivism.24
So too, much is not needed to persuade the law student that there is
something more to the lawfulness of law than the fact of its enactment.
Take the example of a rule where all people who enter a church must
uncover their heads. Those who do not uncover their head will suffer
a severe penalty. Tell a student that a woman with her head fully
covered enters the church and then ask if the rule should apply to her.
In other words, did she violate the law? The answer is, yes. Then tell
the student that the woman had brain surgery and if she unwrapped her
head, her brains would fall out. Suddenly the student questions the
applicability of the rule. Always, the student usually will reach for
some idea, such as equity, mitigation, or mercy to say the law is not a
law for people in the woman's condition. Again, what is being
intuited is that there is something else to law than its mere legality. 2
With this, I want to turn to the idea of law not as legally enacted rules,
but as custom and practice.
voluntary market); Claire Finkelstein, Positivism and the Notion of an Offense 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 335, 342 (2000) (proposing constitutional limits on what can be made a crime should
focus on actus reus and harm rather than on mental states and mens rea).
24. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 35 (1st ed.
1834) ("The true foundation, on which the administration of international law must rest, is,
that the rules, which are to govern, 'are those, which arise from mutual interest and utility, from
a sense of the inconveniences, which would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of
moral necessity to do justice, in order that justice may be done to us in return."); Louise
Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L. J. 53, 70 (1991) ("'Reciprocity' is simply not as safe an
item as 'motherhood' or 'apple pie.' Reciprocal comity is a kind of Kantian imperative, a
golden rule, and thus addresses itself more emphatically to all courts than other normative
models.").
25. This hypothetical is obviously a take off on Lon Fuller's now famous debate with
H.L.A. Hart. Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REV. 630, 663 (1958).
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B. Custom and Personality ofLaw
Sharp division among what we would call religious, ethical, or
legal norms was nonexistent in the central Middle Ages. 26 "Law was
rooted in the soil of ancient custom, riht, and practices. 2 7 Unwritten,
law resided in the collective memory of law-worthy or faithful ones
who, as elders of their various communities, recalled and declared the
law whenever disputes arose and in conjunction with proof by
ordeal.2 8  As Manlio Bellomo writes, "the [written] laws of the
barbarian peoples ... were like an archipelago of tiny islands in the
vast sea of custom."
29
There was no legal profession with lawyers or professional
judges, and this world did not know legal literature. 30 There could be
no jurists where there was no notion of law as an autonomous science.
"The law, in fact, was seen as identical with the art of reasoning and
expression, and on the other hand with ethical standards."'" And
notwithstanding attempts in the Carolingian era to bring about a
conception of law as the sovereign's will in a pale reflection of the
Roman concept of imperium, the idea that law denoted the non-
legislated normative practices of one's people did not begin to lose
sway until the twelfth century; and then only slowly. 32 I want to
highlight several features of this custom-based knowledge of law that
will clarify why the question of the relationship of law and morality
would appear incomprehensible to both the learned and lay persons of
the age.
First, from the time of the barbarian invasions until the dawn of
the early modern period, the notion that men created law-legislated-
26. SUSAN REYNOLDS, KINGDOMS AND COMMUNITIES 900-1300, 16-17 (Oxford
1984)(arguing that before the twelfth century conditions, did not exist that would allow for the
conceptual distinctions between law, right, and custom).
27. Trisha Olson, Of Enchantment: The Passing of the Ordeals and the Rise of the Jury
Trial, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 109, 138 (2000). The word rhit translates to "justice" or "right"
with the reference most often being to custom. See LAWS OF THE KINGS OF ENGLAND FROM
EDMUND TO HENRY I at Indexes (A.J. Robertson ed., and trans. 1925).
28. See Reynolds, supra note 26, at 52-55 (noting that where Roman law was felt,
collective judgment eroded. Susan Reynolds observes, however, that throughout Europe some
form of collective law-remembering remains).
29. MANLIO BELLOMO, THE COMMON LEGAL PAST OF EUROPE 42 (1995).
30. Id. at 44-45.
31. Id. at46.
32. See BERMAN, supra note 2, at 145.
2001]
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would be unthinkable. True, we have Anglo-Saxon dooms going back
to the sixth century and the capitularies of the Frankish empire. But
these written documents were not pieces of legislation; they were
rather declarative statements of custom. 33 The fact of the writing gave
these laws no added authority.34 Not until the rediscovery of the laws
of Justinian and the emergence of the learned jurist in the twelfth
century, did a commitment to written law begin to develop. And even
so, print did not displace oral tradition as a repository of the law until
the latter sixteenth century. 35
Second, for us to conclude that these medieval people
substituted a Divine Being as the lawgiver, and, hence, well
understood the idea of legislation, is far too simplistic. Law was not
conceived of as a list of rights or prohibitions, but rather as a "right
order," a "peace" between one and his fellows. 36 And the content of
this "right order" was not accessible by reference to abstract
propositions, divine or otherwise. Rather, rules of conduct unveiled
themselves slowly and over time. Their unveiling required the
medieval's participation in interpreting signs in the world and in
exercising particularized and contextual judgment to any given
question. Custom was not absolute, but supple, not immutable, but
adaptable.38 One felt his way toward the right situation by situation.
Third, the medieval mind did not conceive of "law" as
obligatory by virtue of the existence of a legal imperative backed by a
threat in case of breach. Indeed, well into the eleventh century in both
England and France (though for very different reasons), the
enforcement of law remained a private affair between a wrongdoer and
an accuser. 39 As a corollary, our medieval ancestor would not have
33. See BELLOMO, supra note 29, at 43.
34. Medieval charters and privately produced lawbooks were "surrounded by and
subordinate to the living legal sense of the community, or the law transmitted by word of
mouth. ... never more than a fragment of the whole law which lives exclusively in the breast
or conscience of the community." FRITZ KERN, KINGSHIP AND LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES, 158
(S.B. Chrimes ed. Westport, Conn., 1985).
35. See Richard Ross, The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers:
Memory as Keyword, Shelter, and Identity, 1560-1640, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 229, 234
(1998).
36. See GEOFFREY KOZIOL, BEGGING PARDON AND FAVOR 218 (1992).
37. See, e.g., id. at 217 (describing Ivo of Chartres understanding of justice as tied not to
the rigors of law but to the moral demands of mercy that thereby led to particularized
judgment in every case).
38. Id.; Ross, supra note 35, at 305.
39. On the idea of criminal wrong as private see FREDERICK POLLOCK AND FREDERIC
WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD III 450-51
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imagined that custom (that is law) and morality were distinct concepts.
The force of custom was precisely its normative force.4 ° One was
obligated to follow a particular custom because it told one the right
way to proceed, not because it was backed by a sanction. Put
differently, medieval customary law is not to be confused with
convention. Customary law did not reference what everybody did as a
matter of social description. Rather, it referenced the right thing to do.
Consistent with this approach, the thirteenth century jurist Bracton had
no timidity about going back to the "older and better rule" if he found
the current one unjust.
Fourth, this identity between law, custom, and morality was not
thought of as effecting a constraint. Law did not limit a person, but
granted her an identity by giving definition to a myriad of relationships
that defined her.42 For example, one was free to be a mother because
she knew the duties, privileges, and subtle variations that denoted the
act of mothering. And this knowledge was passed generation to
generation. Similarly, a corollary point is that in this period, unlike
today, identity was understood relationally rather than
individualistically. One was a member of a vill, a congregation, a
kinship group, a manor.43 The idea of a being primordially existing
independent of her various relations was unintelligible. I add that
there is something right-headed in this idea as the communitarian
literature of the last 25 years or so has stressed.44 When we attempt to
sit and conceive of ourselves, stripped of all relation to place, time,
and historical contingencies, we strain to feel anything there that
( 2 vols 1968); Stanley Rubin, Bot Compensation in Anglo- Saxon Law: A Reassessment,
JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY 17 (1996).
40. See BELLOMO, supra note 29, at 46-47. As A.W.B. Simpson writes of a little later
period: "In the common law system no very clear distinction exists between saying that a
particular solution to a problem is in accordance with the law, and saying that it is the rational,
or fair, or just solution." A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD
ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 79 (Tony Honore ed., 2d Ser., 1973).
41. T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, EARLY ENGLISH LEGAL LITERATURE 58 (1958).
42. See See Simeon L. Guterman, The Principle of Personality of Law in the Early
Middle Ages: A Chapter in the Evolution of Western Legal Institutions and Ideas, 21 UNIV.
MIAMI L. REV. 259, 261 (1966) (asserting that law was part of "the common consciousness of
a people").
43. See, e.g., JACQUES LE GOFF, The Symbolic Ritual of Vassalage, in TIME, WORK, &
CULTURE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 251-52 (Goldhammer trans., 1980) (detailing the spiritual
dimension of seeing oneself as dependent upon another in vassalage).
44. See, e.g., Philip Selznick, The Idea of a Communitarian Morality, 75 CAL. L. REV.
445, 456 (1987); ROBERT H. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985).
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bespeaks the rich complexity we call a human being.
Finally, given that law was identity bearing, it was also, unlike
today, personal. Under this older notion, the customs of one's people
were carried wherever she went as a birthright.45 One's national birth
signified to what people one belonged and, irrespective of what
territory one may journey, this law covered one wherever she may go.
Accordingly, in the ninth century, the answer to the question of whose
law should govern a situation was evident: one's own law.4 6 And that
law was the law of one's people, understood as a community glued
together by tradition, manners, folklore, language, and local religious
practices. Thus, for example, in a land dispute between Saxons, Saxon
law governed whether they lived in Britain or Gaul.47 In the case of a
dispute between people of different nations, some common ground
was found between them. In England we find the mixed jury, whereby
a special jury comprised of both citizens and aliens that was used to
reconcile the law of the community with the law of the alien in the
case of a dispute.48
C. Why Should We Care?
An easy response to the above sketch is that while it may be
interesting, it is irrelevant to contemporary discussions about the
relation between law and morality, even if we accept that positivism
may not truly capture all that law is. We no longer live in small
communities where all adhere to shared norms and beliefs.49
Moreover, recognition of the primacy of the community (and hence of
the rootedness of our obligation .in customs, practices, and norms) is
not recognition of "metaphysical," "transhistorical," or "transcultural
legitimacy." 50  Rather, we are confronted with the knowledge that
normative knowledge (ideology, to use a current term) is a function of
power.5 1 In light of the currency of this idea, scholars offer various
45. See Guterman, supra note 42, at 261; Hessel E. Yntema, The Historic Bases of
Private International Law, 21 AM. J. CoMp. L. 297 (1952).
46. See Guterman, supra note 42, at 261.
47. Id.
48. See MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND
CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE (1994).
49. See John R Wallach, Liberals, Communitarians, and the Tasks of Political Theory,
15 POL. THEORY 581, 594-600 (1987).
50. Daniel R. Ortiz, Categorical Community, 51 STAN. L. REV. 769, 771 (1999).
51. Id. at 778. See also Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative
460 [VOL. 1:451
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approaches designed to distribute the power between communities
more fairly.52 On the other side, the importance of state neutrality, of
not promoting any concept of the good life has continued to be
emphasized in the context of the criminal law.53 In either case, the gap
between law and morality is assumed and the medieval knowledge of
law seems distant and foreign.
Nevertheless, we, in and out of the legal community, seem
still to gravitate toward a way of thinking about law that is in keeping
with that of our medieval ancestors. At the outset, the Austian notion
of law frequently prompts some form of the question: "apart from your
power to coerce me, who are you, sovereign, to tell me I can or cannot
do X?" This question is couched in other terms of course. For
example, in a law school class, the discussion may be about issues of
federalism, 54 communities, or individual rights. Now, frequently the
one who cries out for protection of states' rights is thought to be the
intellectual or political foe of the other who cries out for protection of
her individual right. Yet, at bottom, the two share, albeit not always
self-consciously, a common belief: each claims some way of life as his
"law," or his order, that the ruler (be it a federal or state legislature)
cannot disregard even though its jurisdiction extends to the territory in
Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705, 733.
52. Professor J.M. Balkin discussed the technique of deconstruction in the following
terms:
Described in its simplest form, the deconstructionist project involves the
identification of hierarchical oppositions, followed by a temporary
reversal of the hierarchy. Thus, to use Derrida's favorite example, if the
history of Western civilization has been marked by a bias in favor of
speech over writing we should investigate what it would be like if writing
were more important than speech.... In so doing, we reverse the
privileged position of speech over writing, and temporarily substitute'a
new priority.
J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 746 (1987). See
DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AS TRAINING FOR HIERARCHY, IN THE POLITICS OF LAW
(D. Kairys ed., 1982); Joseph Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory,
94 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1984) (law "is a mechanism for creating and legitimating configurations of
economic and political power").
53. Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 132-134 (1999)("The fact is that, over time, a consensus emerged that the
liberal harm principle prevailed in the legal philosophic debate over the enforcement of
morality.").
54. See Kraig James Powell, The Other Double Standard: Communitarianism,
Federalism, and American Constitutional Law, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 69, 76 n.32 (1996)
(arguing that current American political practice discourages the development of "meaningful
communities").
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which the person is located.55 Similarly, traces of an understanding of
law as personal and rooted in one's given community persist in such
diverse areas as cultural defense for criminal defendants,56 the
rationale for refusing an ignorance of the law defense in malum in se
crimes, 57 the acknowledged place of the law merchant in the framing
and interpretation of the uniform commercial code, 58 and the
recognition of Tribal sovereignty.59 In the criminal law, the language
of liability is richly normative with phrases such as "reasonable
provocation," "depraved heart," and "malice," inviting not a
descriptive but an ethical evaluation by a jury.60  Such evaluation
presupposes, in turn, the existence of some moral bank accessible to
the jury.
Irrespective of our worry about whose normative custom will
become law and thus legally binding upon us (and in the end this
seems to be what the worry about the relation between morality and
law is about), we still may retain an understanding of law as personal
and reflective of our ethos.
55. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 137-38 (1991) ("The myriad associations that generate social norms are the
invisible supports of, and the sine qua non for, a regime in which individuals have rights.");
Linda Ross Meyer, Unruly Rights, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 12 (2000) (conceiving of right
assertions as moral claims).
56. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism:
The Liberals'Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1094-99 (1996).
57. See Sharon L.' Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of
Excusable Ignorance, 48 DuKE L.J. 341 (1998) (notwithstanding erosion of the maxim, noting
its continued acceptance, when mal in se crimes are concerned, on the ground that knowledge
of moral blameworthiness is known).
58. See Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON.
J. 644, 646-56 (1989). The drafters of the UCC clarify that the Code is "in large part a
reformulation and restatement of the law merchant and of the understanding of a business
community which transcends state and even national boundaries." U.C.C. § 1-105 cmt. 3
(1995).
59. See Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDOzO L. REV. 959,
964 n. 17 (1991).
60. See Alan C. Michaels "Rationales" of Criminal Law Then and Now: For a
Judgmental Descriptivism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 54, 66-71 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance
of Law Is an Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV, 127, 128 (1997).
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III. THE ARGUMENT FROM MEANING
In asking about the relationship between law and morality
today, a collateral question has been raised in the symposium about the
appropriate relationship between law and religious values. Again, I
want to suggest that in the central Middle Ages, this question, as
phrased, would not have made much sense. If we are willing to recast
the question, however, something worthwhile can be said about
medieval law and the way in which it was suffused by what may be
loosely called a religious sentiment.
A. The Problem With the Religious Values Question
The medieval period has traditionally been called "the age of
faith," in contradistinction to the eighteenth century "age of reason."
Still, to speak of the place of "religious values" in the central Middle
Ages borders on the anachronistic. First, in terms of the word
"religious," there was not in the Middle Ages a notion of "secular," as
opposed to "religious," modes of reasoning. Indeed we are
wrongheaded to speak of a divide between the spiritual and secular
realm insofar as that divide is meant to imply a distinct frame of
reference or governing epistemology. Not until the late eleventh and
twelfth centuries was the Church's:
priesthood ... called for the first time "spirituals"
(spirituales, in German Geistliche), and the newly
unified Western ecclesiastical hierarchy, under the
papacy, was said to wield the "spiritual sword," as
contrasted with the tribal and feudal and urban laity,
including emperor and kings, who wielded the "secular
sword. '" 1
Second, the way in which we use the word "values" is of
particularly modern origin. The word "value" is at bottom a word of
law and economics. It connotes contriving equivalences, setting
prices, and exchanging.62 So too, the word "values" assumes that
61. See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 2, at 66.
62. See Philippe Nonet, What is Positive Law?, 100 YALE L. J. 667, 670-671 (1990).
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man63 is "himself as the essence [Wesen] that measures values,
evaluates and measures as the 'estimating [abschatzende] animal as
such.... When we criticize our laws, our legal system, or our
lawmakers, we do so by way of evaluating them, by measuring them
up to the values we have set for ourselves, and thus in the light of an
assumed power to legislate."' 64 In contrast, medieval man understood
himself as thrown into a world of meaning which he did not control
and from which he did not seek escape. He did not hold values, but
engaged in practices that both defined him and opened up
possibilities.
65
Moreover, a question exists about whether we ourselves know
what we mean when employing the phrase "religious values." For
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested that
"'[r]eligious beliefs' ... are those that stem from a person's 'moral,
ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong' and are
'held with the strength of traditional religious convictions." 66 Under
this definition the word "religious" adds nothing to the way we
typically speak of the word "values" today. 67 To hold certain acts as
right or wrong would mean one had a religious belief. And insofar as
law, say criminal law, embodies norms, it would (under the Ninth
Circuit definition) embody religious values. Certainly medieval
63. I purposefully use the word "man"; and, indeed, the archetype here is decidedly
masculine in the context of Nietzsche's work referenced.
64. Nonet, supra note 62, at 670-671.
65. See, e.g., BEOWULF 22:1534 (Joseph. F. Tuso ed., E. Talbot Donaldson trans., 1975)
("So shall a man when he aims to earn lasting praise in battle-he does not worry about his
death."). The deeply rooted and long life of the heroic ideal for England is apt to be
overlooked if one sees in that age an ethic of "hopeless courage." As Kenneth Sisam
observes, never does Beowulf brood on death and always does the poet show him as fearless.
Kenneth Sisam, The Structure of Beowuif, in BEOWULF, supra at 116-17. Similarly, in a little
later period one sees the same heroic confronting of fate and determination to act well in face
of it in the songs of deeds. See generally DOROTHY L. SAYERS, THE SONG OF ROLAND 57, at
line 2355-63 (1957). These epics were particularly popular during the late eleventh century
and recited along the pilgrim routes that dotted western Europe retelling a history that assumed
the audience's knowledge. Id. at 9-10.
66. United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970)).
67. See, e.g., John Witte, Jr., A Dickensian Era of Religious Rights: An Update on
Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 707, 756 (2001) ("A
creed defines the accepted cadre of beliefs and values concerning the ultimate origin, meaning,
and purpose of life.") (emphasis added).
68. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, supra note 22, at 351; George P.
Fletcher, The Fall and Rise of Criminal Theory, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 275, 287 (1998) ("The
utilitarians and Kantians have in fact had much to say about the rationale for punishment.
Virtue theorists have recently offered us a more subtle account of culpability.").
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criminal law was about right and wrongful conduct. And today, at
least in the context of malum in se crimes, this remains true. But the
added word "religious" adds or subtracts nothing from this realization.
By "religious value," we may mean to say that if the exponent
of a particular norm was a theologian or canonist, then afortiori, the
norm expressed becomes a "religious value." As historians who work
with the Roman-canonical law well know, this argument would then
sweep a vast number of our legal principles under the label of religious
argument. For example, modem commercial law and contract law are
rooted in medieval canon laws.69 Civil and criminal procedural rules
such as the requirement of written procedures or hearsay rules, or the
privilege against self-incrimination have similar roots.70 That modem
theorists mean to include all the above when debating the place of
religious norms in law is doubtful.
Moreover, the corpus of canon law bequeathed to us resulted
methodologically from the very sort of modes of reasoning that
modem theorists are inclined to call rational, in contradistinction from
religious. As Charles Reid and Professor John Witte observe, "[i]t was
in [the] vibrant intellectual context of the twelfth century ... in accord
with the dialectical method then being worked out in the schools of
philosophy by the likes of Peter Abelard," that the Concordance of
Discordant Canons (conventionally known as Decretum) (ca. 1141 or
1142) was compiled by Gratian. 71  The dialectical rigor of the
scholastic logicians certainly does not fall under, for example,
Professor Michael Perry's definition of what constitutes a "religious
argument":
By a "religious" argument, I mean ... an argument that
presupposes the truth of a religious belief and includes
that belief as one of its essential premises. A
69. See JOHN W. BALDWIN, MEDIEVAL THEORIES OF THE JUST PRICE (1959).
70. See, e.g., RICHARD H. HELMHOLZ et al., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT (1997); Richard H. Helmholz, The Early
History of the Grand Jury and the Canon Law, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 613 (1983); Richard H.
Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self- Incrimination: The Role of the European Ius
Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1990); Frank R. Herrmann, The Establishment of a Rule
Against Hearsay in Romano-Canonical Procedure, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1995); Frank R.
Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of
the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 481 (1994). See generally Charles J. Reid, Jr. &
John Witte, Jr., In the Steps of Gratian: Writing the History of Canon Law in the 1990s, 48
EMORY L.J. 647 (1999).
71. Charles J. Reid, Jr. & John Witte, Jr., supra note 70, at 661.
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"religious" belief is, for present purposes, either the
belief that God exists--"God" in the sense of a
transcendent reality that is the source, the ground, and
the end of everything- or a belief about the nature, the
activity, or the will of God.72
As a corollary, we speak of religious values today from an analytical
framework that assumes we can disengage one mode of thinking from
another. But among the texts woven into the classical canon law are
the Bible, the Corpus iuris civilis of Emperor Justinian (527-565), the
early Christian canons of various councils, as well as collections of
juridical writings. One cannot simply pull out one source, as Professor
Perry's definition implies is possible, and discard it, for what the
canon law achieved was synthesis of an entire cultural mentality
webbed together in such a way that each strand connected and
strengthened another.
Finally, by "religious value," we may simply mean to refer to
any meta-theory that purports to provide a blueprint for ethical conduct
independent of any historical contingency. But if this is the case, it is
we in the legal academy of the twenty-first century who are the
champions of such meta-theories. In all varieties of law and
economics, critical legal studies, law and feminism, and critical race
theory one finds such schemes of measurement. 73 Insofar as we think
that to bring a religious view to bear upon the law is to evaluate one's
community by some standard existing outside of it, we who are caught
up in the law and movements, perhaps, should claim the religious
label.74
In contrast, the idea that medieval law was rooted in part in a
belief that scripture provided guidance about what was proper either as
matter of substance or procedure tells us very little, if anything at all,
about the tie between law and "religious arguments" in the period.
There was, until the twelfth century, little thought of interpreting
scripture in such a way that it yielded abstracted rules to be imposed
72. Michael Perry, The Religious Voice in the Public Square: Religious Arguments in
Public Political Debate, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1421, 1423 (1996).
73. See ANTHONY T, KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 166-68 (1994).
74. See Brett Scharffs, The Role of Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom, 32 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 127, 129 (1998) (making a like contrast between external and internal theories
of judicial judgment).
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upon a pre-existing community. 75  The legal argumentation of the
learned was mediated and adapted through layers of tradition with
strict and respectful adherence to those who taught and wrote before.
76
It was our ancestors, living in an age of faith, who most carefully kept
their attention focused upon the context of a dispute, the concrete
details involved, and the equities required.77 For example, in the case
of blasphemy, while Scripture provided the example of the Old
Testament story of King Nebuchadnezzar's decree requiring the
punishment of blasphemers with death, the canonists did not seek to
draw a literal lesson from the example. "The problem, they said, was
that if blasphemy were punished as it should have been, too few men
would be left.",
78
My intention here is to only highlight the difficulty of speaking
of "religious values" in the context of today's discussion and in the
context of medieval law. One insight, however, can be drawn from
comparing the past with today. On one hand, we can live in
repudiation of all that is typically associated with religious belief and
nonetheless argue for a jurisprudential understanding of law that
shares much affinity in its form with what we would call religious. On
the other hand, the fact of belonging to a people with a rich spiritual
life and a commitment to the deep ethical import of law does not
necessarily lead to a belief in law as abstract categorical declarations
that can provide a source of normative practices for people requiring
no interpretative mediation.
Still, if we recast the religious values question, it is possible to
say something meaningful about the nexus between medieval man's
religiosity and his way of conceiving of law, wrongdoing, and criminal
sanction.
75. See R.H. Helmholz, The Bible in the Service of Canon Law, 70 CHICAGO-KENT L.
REV. 1557, 1569-70 (1995) (discussing canonists view of Scriptures as yielding principles
rather than posited legal enactments.).
76. See T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 40 (1955).
77. See RICHARD FIRTH GREEN, A CRISIS OF TRUTH 83-85 (1999) (tracing modes of
dispute resolution in tenth and eleventh centuries).
78. See Helmholz, supra note 75, at 1570.
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B. Are We Really Talking About Sense and Significance?
Consider that the subject is not about referencing a source from
which one may deduce a set of ethical mandates, but rather that the
link between religion and medieval law was about a certain
temperament-an understanding of the sense and significance of the
universe. 79 As a caveat, note that insofar as the question about the
relationship between religion and law was for the medieval mind a
question about the relationship between the meanings of his universe
and the way those meanings should be expressed in law. In this sense,
we are again closer to our ancestors than we may at first think.
Granted, in the last twenty years, more and more frequently the
law (and its scholars) seems to softly scream at us, "we exist in a
universe of sound and fury signifying nothing." As Professor Linda
Meyer writes, "[t]he tendency of law to dispense with obligations, and
to talk instead in terms of regulation and incentives, shows us to
ourselves as the effects of causes."
80
Instead of defining due care in tort law as
reasonableness, we define it as economic efficiency-
as what sanctions are necessary in order to control
behavior and organize energy effectively. Contracts is
no longer about honor or promises, but about regulating
or deregulating behavior to 8I roduce economically
efficient distributions of capital.
In criminal law we seek to induce wrongdoers to refrain from further
crime by means of deterrence and behavior modification. Syndrome
defenses abound, and the traditional knowledge of "heat of passion" is
transformed by the Model Penal Code into the defense of "externally
79. The possibility that to think "religiously" might not be about the direction to choose
specific outcomes, but about how one goes about thinking and evaluating a given problem has
been nicely addressed by Scott Idleman. See Scott Idleman, The Limits of Religious Values in
Judicial Decisionmaking, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 537, 543 n.20 (1998) (faith commitments may
affect a judge's disposition or perspective on authority, a judge's reasoning or rhetorical style).
See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 27-53 (1988) (approaches to constitutional
interpretation may be considered "Protestant" or "Catholic" in nature by virtue of their relative
emphasis on text, tradition, and so forth).
80. Linda Ross Meyer, Is Practical Reason Mindless?, 86 GEO. L.J. 647, 670-71 (1998)
[hereinafter Is Practical Reason Mindless?].
81. Id. at 668.
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influenced emotional disturbance." Yet, "[t]he irony is, of course, that
if everything we do is due to something else, there is no one to direct
all the regulation and management.... No one is left to be responsible
for all the managing and regulation; no one is left to choose among
purposes. We are all transformed into the objects of prediction and
control. 82 On this account, what remains in the world is only power.
Hence Nietzsche's cry, that this world is nothing but a sea of forces, "a
play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time one and many ...
flowing and rushing together ... without goal.",83 "This world is the
will to power-and nothing besides,
84
Yet we resist completely succumbing. We still attempt to
make sense, to locate meaning, to (dare I say) seek truth no matter how
contingent, hazy, contradictory, and constantly in movement, it may
be. We do not quite give up belief in our freedom to think, witness,
and understand. And for some scholars this faith and search is
distinctly medieval. As if they hear distant whispers from a long ago
past, these scholars keep attention upon human finitude, and hence
they modestly refrain from seeking the unconditional truth of any
matter.85 Yet, on the other hand, they share the medieval faith that the
world we inhabit illuminates some portion of this elusive thing called
truth. Hence, in the literature, scholars reach toward rhetoric 86 or
Aristotle's teaching on practical reason to discern the rhyme and
reason of judicial decision. 87 Others peer into the dusty hidden comers
of ancient legal history, into heavy dense manuscripts of canonical
exposition and endless glosses or capitularies and epistles to
painstakingly piece together the story and the messages left to us.
88
And in so doing, we prove our bloodline with the religious medieval
82. Id. at 672.
83. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER §1067, at 550 (W. Kaufmann trans.
1968).
84. Id. (emphasis in original).
85. This attribute separates these scholars from either those who insist on objective
rationality (for we are already in truth, or those who posit radical subjectivity. The latter
works with the same distinctions as the former.
86. See James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and
CommunalLife, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1985).
87. Is Practical Reason Mindless?, supra note 80, at 652. (exploring the unrootedness of
practical reason as a gracious openness to the world); Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism About
Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARv. L. REV. 714, 742 (1994).
88. See, e.g., John S. Beckerman, Procedural Innovation and Institutional Change in
Medieval English Manorial Courts, 10 LAW & HIST. REV. 197, 201 (1992) (exploring action
for injury to honor in what we now call tort law); Richard H. Helmoholz, Magna Carta and
the lus Commune, 66 U.CHI. L. REv. 297 (1999).
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man who "never forgot that everything would be absurd if it exhausted
its meaning in its immediate function and form of manifestation. '" 89
He knew, as do we, that all things extend beyond their appearance.
This knowledge allows us to connect isolated moments and render
sensible a world of constant change and movement. Put differently, in
that we too think nothing empty or meaningless exists, we share in
what Johan Huizinga called the "religious emotion" of medieval
man.9 °
C. The Symbolic Nature of the Medieval World
For the medieval, the salient feature of his pietistic affection
was his belief in the fundamental inter-connectedness of all ideas,
beings, and things. He located meaning in the idea of synthesis, in the
concept of unity. Divinity itself was understood as neither solitary nor
singular. His very existence as three in one was an existence in
communion. As contemplated by the Cappadocian Fathers (Basil the
Great d. 379, Gregory of Nyssa d. 395 and Gregory of Nazianzus d.
390), the Divine's inner nature was relational-a state of "reciprocal
delight" where one could "not conceive of either [Father or Son] apart
from their relationship with each other." 92 The Holy Spirit, in turn,
came forth as the emanating "breath" of that perfected union.93 This
understanding of the meaningful as always denoting the whole rather
than the part gave rise to a discourse of symbology and rite which so
permeated social beliefs as to shape thinking about notions of
community, law, and wrongdoing.
Moreover, the practices that comprised the doing of law were
as much acts of devotion as they were acts of legal signification. One
might say that no practice or act lacked an element of the moral or the
89. JOHAN HUIZINGA, THE AUTUMN OF THE MIDDLE AGES 235 (R.J. Payton trans., 1996).
90. Id. at 234.
91. The Cappadocian Fathers articulated trinitarian theology The Theological Orations
of Gregory of Nazianzus in which he defends the divinity of the Son and Holy Spirit is
perhaps most important in influence for both the Eastern and Western Church. See EDMUND J.
FORTMAN, THE TRIUNE GOD: A HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY 76
(1901); T.A. Noble, Paradox in Gregory of Nazianzen's Doctrine of the Trinity, XXVII
STUDIA PATRISTICA 94 (1993).
92. GERALD O'COLLINS, THE TRIPERSONAL GOD, UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING
THE TRINITY 132 (1999).
93. Fortman, supra note 91, at 79. Basil stressed that the Holy Spirit was the breath of
Divinity and thus not below it whereas Gregory of Nazianzus spoke of the Spirit as
"procession" (ekporeusis). Id. at 80.
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ethical. Yet, the words as modernity calls upon them says too little,
are too thin, to capture the meaning of the idea that lawful action, at its
core, comprised a prayer. Suffice to say that the idea of unity provided
the reason, the ground, and the aim of all expressions of law. And
those expressions were meaningful in themselves, for the hallmark of
this age was its belief in the immanent presence of the Deity.
94
Rather than existing transcendently apart and exterior to the
world, this ultimate Perfection was born of an irradiance, "a downward
spilling burst of luminosity" that united all beings and "irrigat[ed] the
entire world establishing order and coherence within it."95 Thus, in
this world intangible interlaced with the perceivable and, until the end
of the twelfth century when scholasticism revived logical speculation,
"[i]n the eyes of all who were capable of reflection the material world
was scarcely more than a sort of mask" behind which sat the worthy
and true. 96 "Even at its most dreadful, nature" the world was an
"alphabet through which God spoke to man ... the world was [His]
discourse" to us.
97
This idea of the significance of the endlessly changing and
chaotic world resting in Perfected Union and of the human world's
participation in its manifestation colored and provided the surrounding
context for how the medieval age conceived of criminal sanctions.
IV. THE GIFT OF SANCTION
In the language of today's symposium, nowhere is the
inextricable nature of "law and morality" in the medieval period more
arresting than in its practices of what we call punishment. I begin with
the idea of community. Next the discussion will turn to the medieval
conception of wrongdoing. The stage will then be set to consider the
law of sanctions.
94. See Olson, supra note 27, at 133-36.
95. GEORGES DUBY, THE AGE OF THE CATHEDRALS 100 (1981).
96. MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 83-84 (L.A. Manyon trans., 1961).
97. UMBERTO Eco, ART AND BEAUTY IN THE MIDDLE AGES 54 (Hugh Bredin trans.,
1986); KAREN JOLLY, POPULAR RELIGION IN LATE SAXON ENGLAND 72-73 (1996).
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A. Community
In this universe, where the worldly always signified a partially
hidden meaning and an open pathway existed between heaven and
earth, concord between men was appropriate not only because it
honored the ideal of the Holy Accord: It literally embodied it. In daily
life, each act of enhancing-and transfiguring a deed, word, or oath
contained a liturgical element for perfecting-rendered the divine
possibility concrete. 98 In turn, perfecting required the harnessing of
polarities. Reconciliation of that which stood in potential opposition
was for the medieval mind a core attribute of the Divine. To speak in
Hegel's terms, to live in harmony and fellowship through law gave
flesh to the idea of union, thereby actualizing what was before a mere
universal of possibility.99 There was in the idea of friendly and
peaceful relations a trace of the holy.
Although words such as "holy," "sacred," or "embodiment" are
not common ways to speak, of the ideal of community today,
contemporary scholars reach for something akin to the medieval way.
They speak of lawfulness as reflecting and giving life to an intangible,
meaningful, and primordial bond-a right (recht) order between men
and women,100 understanding of the world, given to us by a common
past. Yet, a yellow light of caution should begin to flicker here.
Although there is much that seems worthy, even noble, in the
contemporary discussion about the way wrong and sanction is
wrapped within, albeit often unspoken, understandings of communal
union, I respectfully tender the thought that the contemporary
discussion about what comprises a community remains thin when
98. See HUIZINGA, supra note 89, at 44, 58, 292-293.
99. See G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 5 (T.M. Knox trans., 1st ed. 1952). See
Philippe Nonet, Sanction, 25 CUMB. L. REv. 489, 491 (1995) ("But sanction, as we shall see,
is precisely the overcoming of and return from estrangement. In this return, the native tongue
has the power to say. The word Hegel employs is die Aufopferug (e.g., GPR § 100), in
English 'the offering.' An offering is a sacrifice, and in Latin sacrificare says the same as
sancire. To offer is in turn always also to suffer the pain of renouncing.").
100. See Linda Ross Meyer, Forgiveness and Public Trust, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1515,
1519 (2000) ("The way we make sense of each others' actions lies deep in our language and
understanding of the world, given to us by a common past. The post-modem discovery that
we are "socially constructed" beings is now commonplace, usually asserted to underscore
cultural differences and distinctions, but it also entails that we have a deep connection to each
other-we already share language, ways of thinking, ways of feeling, and ways of going on
that we were born into and that shape our human world. We may vary in our expressions of
respect, in the details of our expectations and our norms, but we still share some bedrock.").
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viewed in light of the medieval example.
In a recent article on the place of forgiveness in punishment,
Professor Meyer notes that arguably we live in many communities. By
way of example, she proffers that Catholics, skinheads, African
Americans, gays, survivalists and intellectuals all form various
communities.1° 1  She then goes on to argue, however, that our
"common linguistic heritage means that we share many basic
concepts" such as "understandings of meaningful human action and
basic norms of respect"'10 2 that cut across these group lines. In other
words, we share basic knowledge of right and wrong conduct as
expressed in the criminal law. She continues that it is critical to realize
that we proceed to live with each other in trust of that belief.10 3 And
when we meet a stranger, Professor Meyer argues, we assume that
stranger will make sense.'0 4 Hence, the horror of wrong. "The more
deeply a crime breaches basic public trust, the more 'strange,
'inhuman' and 'senseless' it seems."'10
5
Now, the first problem is obvious; and Professor Meyer
recognizes it herself. Seemingly, the examples offered of community
are not communities at all, but interest-groups. 0 6 To share ethos,
however, is not necessarily to share interests, nor does the rich idea of
ethos, of the spirit of a people, have anything to do with interests.
Rather, the idea of community reaches deeper and is more narrow than
Professor Meyer allows. Indeed, in terms of the latter point, it is
precisely the "stranger" who is distrusted by a community."' In part,
what made a medieval jury's moral evaluations of an accused's
conduct possible was its narrowly confined view of what kind of deeds
demonstrated character or its lack. The making of this judgment
presupposed the jury's ability to take note of whether an accused was
known to be a "good son," a "lawful man," or was but a stranger.'
0 8
As to the first point, shared norms in the context of the criminal
law outstretch far deeper into a people's heritage than, for examples,
101. Id. at 1519.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1520.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1521.
106. Id. at 1519.
107. For example, trial by oath required a swearing as to an accused's or accuser's
reputation. If one was a stranger, it would be impossible to acquire sufficient oath-swearers.
See Olson, supra note 27, at 118-120, 183.
108. Id.
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rules of the road. The law of murder suffices to make the point. The
Medieval person's shared concrete practical knowledge about the
ugliness of killing by stealth, and the possible justification for, or at
least acceptability of, killing in open, particularly in the heat of blood.
What sort of weapon was used, the details of the brawl, the standing of
the wrongdoer in the ville or the county all went into the jury's
judgment that morally evaluated the accused's conduct. As Professor
Tom Green has detailed, out of this complex community knowledge of
what constituted a culpable and partially justified killing, manslaughter
law slowly evolved. 109 What made (say the thirteenth century) jury's
judgment possible was a rich, complicated, moral life that rolled and
stretched back to an ancient heroic code recorded in literature,
referenced in homilies, refined and folded into a shared religion,
expressed in architectural motifs, and heralded in ballads.
This is not our world. Certainly Professor Meyer must be right
that we proceed in basic public trust with each other when we drive on
a highway or buy a cup of coffee at McDonalds. But do we share
basic notions of right and wrong when it comes to the nitty gritty of
the daily grinding of the criminal law? Can we doubt that, for
example, the local gang member from South Central in Los Angeles,
California standing accused of, and guilty of, a low level charge of
distribution of cocaine may claim very distinct law from those who
live in the small wealthy community of Pasadena, California? Basic
laws about what constitutes respect, what sort of "boundaries" should
exist between persons of "equal" respect (all terms of educated
middle-class America), or what is an appropriate response to shows of
disrespect may differ dramatically. For one man, a killing of another
who has grievously dishonored him is a noble, justified, and proper
response whereas for others it constitutes murder.' °
The point here is not to advocate some sort of contrived return
to a deeper, more substantial, more dramatic understanding of
community. It cannot be. We cannot decide to make, create, legislate,
or artificially construct community. In recognizing the world we live
in now, in confronting the divide between diverse community norms
and generalized legal prohibitions head on, in the area of our discourse
about community, wrong and sanction, we may also need to come to
109. THOMAS GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL 1200-1800 22-35 (1985).
110. See Elijah Anderson, The Code of the Streets, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1994, at
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grips with the import of what we theorists do. Potentially we are
engaged in a kind of intellectual play that is close to asking how many
angels can fit on a pinhead."'
Still, though we should be cautious about too quickly locating
community within our time, as the previous discussion of personality
of law implied, some idea of community continues to reverberate with
us even if faintly. And insofar as it does, we too retain (albeit vaguely)
a knowledge of wrong that also echoes the medieval.
B. Wrong As The Betrayal of Trust
Professor Meyer has offered an answer to the question: what is
wrong about wrong? As she rightly observes, typically we think of
wrong in terms of harms done to individuals. 112 We think the harm
must be undone either to restore value to the injured party, or to nullify
the problem of free-riders." 3 In the latter case, what's wrong with
wrong is that an outlaw takes advantage of the sacrifices of others.
Thus sanction rights the unfair distribution of liberty.'1 4  There is
something, she says, obviously wrongheaded about both constructs.
For one, wrong under this definition would not include those acts that
caused no harm but which we all would find morally bankrupt, such as
the taking of candy from a baby or the defrauding of a person who
experienced no sense of injury due to a particular quirk in her
character. " 5  Moreover, Professor Meyers submits that if we truly
believed that our theories of wrongdoing were founded upon an ideal
of equal distributions and restraints of our liberty, the only citizens
with standing to insist on punishment would be those with an
inclination to lawlessness." 6 Rather, she argues, wrongdoing is not
about harms (though I would suggest that we use the fact of a harm as
one signal that a wrong may have occurred), but about a person's
decision to breach the trust of his relation with his fellow community
111. Note that Professor Meyer seems to agree, for as she concedes, punishment between
strangers makes no sense. There is no breach in a union to repair. See Meyer, supra note 100,
at 1525.
112. Id. at 1516; Finkelstein, supra note 23, at 342 (providing an account of wrong has
harm and focused on actus reus rather than mens rea and moral culpability).
113. See Meyer, supra note 100, at 1516.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1517.
116. Id.
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members." 17
What Professor Meyer has traced is an understanding of wrong
close to the medieval's understanding. For medieval man, wrongdoing
was conceived of as a breaking of faith, fidelitas." 8  As late as
Malory's Tristan, King Mark is portrayed as a "fals traitou" to his
vassal Sir Tristran. 119  And well into the fourteenth century, the
English remained wedded to the idea that each, including a King, was
defined and constrained by his trothplight to others. 120 Wrong was, at
its essence, the breaking of one's bond. The outlaw engaged in a
corruption in that he damaged the peace of another and dishonored
him. By his deed, he also corrupted himself by breaching those bonds
that granted him identity' 2 1 and damaged his relation to his god. In
eleventh century England, it was the right and duty of every man to
pursue a fleeing man, to hunt him as prey for he was caput gerat
lupinum-a friendless man-a wolf.12  The rigor of this stance
bespoke the deadly seriousness of breaking bond. Those wrongs of a
particularly wicked nature became our felonies. Yet, again the
locating of commonality should not wash away difference.
The medieval also saw what we often refuse to see today. The
breach of trust at the core of wrongdoing not only corrupts-stains-
the wrongdoer, it stains the person wronged. We lie to victims when
we say that their "true ... dignity is never touched by criminal
actions."' 123 For the medieval this basic truth rang loud. In contrast to
modem accounts of the nature of wrong, the medieval person
experienced wrong as a sullying of another's honor and dignity. It
117. Id. at 1520-22.
118. Olson, supra note 27, at 194-95.
119. CAXTON'S MALORY, A NEW EDITION OF SIR THOMAS MALORY'S LE MORTE
D'ARTHUR 1:562 (2 vols. J. Spisak & W. Mmatthews eds. 1983).
120. Hence, treason remained well into the fourteenth century essentially a betrayal of
trust. R. GREEN, supra note 77, at 231.
121. This is a point noted recently by Stephen P. Garvey. See Stephen P. Garvey,
Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801 (1999) (though he does not note the way in
which one may breach relations with his Deity through a breach with fellows, Professor
Garvey reads Anselm as speaking of an unmediated relationship with the Divine).
122. See HENRY BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 362 (S. Thome
trans. & ed. 1968) ("An outlaw also forfeits everything connected with the peace, for from the
time he is outlawed he bears the wolf's head, so that he may be slain by anyone with impunity,
especially if he resists or takes flight so that his arrest is difficult.").
123. Meyer, supra note 100, at 1527. But see JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON,
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 14, 25 (1988) ("Intentional wrongdoing insults us and attempts
(sometimes successfully) to degrade us-and thus it involves a kind of injury that is not
merely tangible and sensible.").
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could be no other way. In a world where identity is not individualistic,
but tied to, and dependent upon, our various relationships with others
then a rupturing and blackening of a relationship is a blackening of
both the wrongdoer and the one wronged. The idea of the psychology
of the individual came at the end of the twelfth century. Until that
time, the world was a place of deeds and those deeds took place
between persons shaping, elevating, or degrading the appearance of
each. Hence, the feud commanded respect. It said that one was not
"timid" and would take action to restore his reputation (fama being the
touchstone of whether one dwelled in a state of honor or shame).12
Those scholars who insist that criminal law and wrongdoing
pertain to moral culpability, in distinction from those who argue for a
harm-based notion of culpability, still fail to acknowledge the above.
Arguably, the reason is twofold. First, we are very uncomfortable
today with the idea of that a wrong can sully a victim, for we think
mistakenly that such a judgment is about a person's moral worth. 125
Yet, we need to tread carefully when trying to discern the meaning of
this sullying. We need to not be afraid of the idea that one can become
less of a man, or less of a woman because of a wrong done them, and
yet realize that this fact is not a moral evaluation of their worth.126
Wrong can indeed demean, humiliate, defile or desecrate another
being insofar as he stands in relation to a wrongdoer and to those who
see him as humiliated, lowered, or impotent. And in that a wrong
accomplishes these things, the victim stands dirtied, much as an altar
where sacrilege has occurred is tarnished.
The second problem for scholars in confronting the stain on the
victim from wrongdoing is that they suspect recognition will lead to a
theory of retributive justice where somehow the belief exists that the
victim's devaluing will be set right by a like devaluing of the
wrongdoer. 127 They rightly see this for what it is-the endless cycle of
124. See Julian Pitt-River, Honour and Social Status, in HONOUR AND SHAME 27-28 (J.G.
Peristiany ed., 1966).
125. See Meyer, supra note 100, at 1527.
126. See Garvey, supra note 121, at 1821 (confusing question of degrading with moral
worth of victim, and denying that latter can be touched).
127. See Paul Campos, The Paradox of Punishment, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1931, 1933
(1992); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS
CRITICS 1, 13 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) ("The retributive punisher uses the infliction of
suffering to symbolize the subjugation of the subjugator, the domination of the one who
dominated the victim.").
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wrong upon wrong in the name of vengeance. 28 But a theory of
retribution does not necessarily follow from an understanding of
wrongdoing as sullying both the wrongdoer and the victim.
C. Punishment as Penitential Atonement
Granting variation across the centuries, common threads
concerning the meaning of sanction prevailed up until the twelfth
century. Loosely, we may say that woven together these threads
formed an understanding of sanction neither as retribution nor as an
instrument of crime prevention, but as penitential atonement. The
stuff and matter of this understanding was shaped by the nexus
between law and morality that so marks the medieval period.
Lawfulness denoted right action and breaking of the law, wrong.
Sanction too was tied to ethical conduct in that the medieval saw it as
an obligation upon the doing of a wrong. 129 The question this begs, of
course, is what were the moral details of sanction? What, if not the
mere infliction of suffering upon the wrongdoer, did sanction consist
of in this period? And what about sanction rendered it a good and
noble act?
At its conceptual core, medieval sanction denoted reunion
between a wrongdoer and those he had affronted by his wrong. Thus
sanction held the possibility of both healing the wrongdoer and of
wiping away the stain of dishonor that imprinted itself upon the
wronged. Casting this idea slightly differently, the moral content of
sanction pertained not to its recognition of the injured right of the
person wronged. Instead, sanction was a moral good in that it sought
to reunite those who had been divided. Recall that in the idea of
concord-of union with others-the divine possibility became
concrete. 30  Accordingly, in all disputes, criminal or otherwise, the
medieval sensibility aimed at concord. 131 Concords-agreements to
128. See Meyer, supra note 100, at 1525-27.
129. Insofar as the medieval conceived of sanction as an obligation that followed from
wrongdoing, it shares with retribution. See George P. Fletcher, Criminal Theory in The
Twentieth Century, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 265, 268 (2001).
130. See supra n.91-93 & accompanying text.
131. The term finslis concordia does not appear in legal documents from England until
soon after the Norman Conquest, the Anglo-Saxon agreements were akin in substance and
spirit. See Valerie A. Sanchez, Towards a History of ADR: The Dispute Processing
Continuium in Anglo Saxon England and Today, 11 OHIO ST. J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 32 (1996). In
LEGES HENRIC PRIMI 164, 176 (L.J. Dower trans., 1972), one finds the statement, disputants
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remain friends for perpetuity-were not an aberration from the norm
of litigation. Instead, they were an integral part of the wider medieval
legal system, and were able to occur seconds before the judgment of
ordeal was to take place.' 
32
This idea of punishment, as a step in reuniting the wrongdoer
and his community, has gained notice in the literature as of late.
Those in the "restorative justice movement," 133 criminal law scholars
writing on atonement as a proper paradigm for understanding
punishment, 34 and scholars interested in the ties between Anglo-
Saxon dispute resolution and the current Alternative Dispute
Resolution model1 35 all carry traces of the medieval conception of
sanction. Yet, at this point of the discussion, we may find ourselves
the most distant from our ancestors.
Typically discussions about punishment's relation to penance
begin with Saint Anselm of Canterbury. 136  In the eleventh century,
Saint Anselm asked how is God's infinite justice to be reconciled with
his infinite mercy. 137 To put the question a bit differently, how can a
judge ensure that the debt of wrong is paid, thereby restoring balance,
and at the same time extend mercy by forgiving the requirement of
punishment? This question of course remains with us today in that the
legal academy struggles to discern whether mercy has any place in
criminal sentencing. In his effort to solve the theological paradox,
Anselm observed that God could not justly forgive man's wrongs for
then He seems to violate the order of the universe that He must uphold
to remain consonant with Himself.139  On the other hand, He was
infinite grace.14  Anselm then found, in the idea of satisfaction, a way
are "brought together by love or separated by judgment." In the time of Henry II, we find the
statement in Glanvill that "it is generally true that agreement prevail over law." G.D.G. HALL,
THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED
GLANVILL 129 (G.D.G. Hall trans. & ed. 1993).
132. See Edward Powell, Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration in Fifteenth Century
England, 2 LAW & HIST. REV. 21, 29 (1984) (discussing rituals that had long use in practice,
though a little later period than we are discussing).
133. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment is Marginalized: Realistic
or Utopian, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1738 (1999).
134. See Meyer, supra note 100, at 1525; Garvey, supra note 121, at 1801.
135. See Valerie A. Sanchez, Towards a History of ADR: The Dispute Processing
Continuum in Anglo Saxon England and Today, 11 OHIO ST. J. DiSP. RESOL. 1, 32 (1996).
136. See BERMAN, supra note 2, at 175-81.
137. ANSELM, Cur Deus Homo, in BASIC WRITINGS (Deane trans., 1990).
138. See, e.g., MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 123, at 1- 34; 162-86.
139. ANSELM, supra note 137, at 204.
140. Id.
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to transverse the chasm between grace and justice.
In modem parlance, we think of satisfaction as payment. We
"satisfy" a debt, a requirement. This idea of a debt justifies our most
traditional notions of retribution. The wrongdoer having robbed
another of his "value" now owes a restoration of that value by his own
devaluing.141 Anselm recognized, in a theological context, what many
of us intuit in our everyday lives. Insofar as wrong constitutes a
breaking of bond with another-a betraying of trust which sullies
another's dignity by treating her as "less than," the moral harm is
limitless: It cannot be priced. 142 Common sense confirms the idea. As
any woman who has endured beatings by her husband knows, no
amount of suffering inflicted upon her husband will restore the right
order between them, or recover her sense of delight in her
womanhood, in the way a payment cancels out a debt. Something very
different needs to occur between her and her husband for sanction-a
reunion-to be kindled.
Anselm conceived of satisfaction not as a payment, but as an
offering. 143 Whereas punishment is a thing "exacted," satisfaction is a
thing "freely given" which restores a man's relationship to the one
wronged, much as a remorseful beloved bringing flowers to his
offended lover reaffirms the beloved's pledge. 144  The reason an
offering restores, Anselm said, is that pricelessness inheres only in
gifts: what is unconditioned. Given that wrong too is priceless-
unpayable, it is only a gift that can begin to wipe one clean. 14 5 Anselm
provided the dogma of penance consisting of the four interwoven steps
of contrition of heart, confession of mouth, satisfaction of deeds, and
the infusion of grace.
While the laity was both uneducated and illiterate, the spirit
which opened this discourse to Anselm predominated medieval life.
For example, the complicated system of bot, "betterment," among the
Germanic peoples, which designated compensations to be paid for
various wrongs as a substitute for resolve by blood feud was tied to the
penitential system. 146 Overlap existed between the penitential manuals
141. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 123, at 122-47.
142. ANSELM, supra note 137, at 208-16.
143. Id. at 209.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 216, 241.
146. See, e.g., Thomas P. Oakley, English Penitential Discipline and Anglo Saxon Law in
Their Joint Influence, in STUDIES IN HISTORY ECONOMIC AND DUBUL LAW 136-151 (1923).
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and, for example, the Anglo-Saxon law codes, whereby the latter often
mandated the former. Both the penitential and "legal" literature of the
Anglo Saxons spoke of expiation rather than punishment. At trial by
ordeal, the hagiography and chronicles tell us that a wrongdoer's
contrition often led to his acquittal. 147 In a little later period, we find
evidence suggestive of the medieval jury's inclination to forgive in the
high acquittal rate. 148 The bench accepted verdicts of self-defense
though that coroner indictments show that a number of cases were
sudden arguments that resulted in death. Again, if we rely on the
narratives of the period to put flesh on bare statistics, a picture
emerges in the tenth and eleventh century of a culture saturated
through and through. by complex penitential rituals whereby the
wrongdoer's redemption hovered, as a promise in light of his
demonstration of contrition or sacrificial acts.
As indicated above, many contemporary theorists call on the
language of punishment as atonement. And in so doing, they seem to
call on a clear understanding of criminal law as morally grounded, and
on an understanding of sanction as repair of the moral injury. This
literature would seem to echo the medieval mentality. In considering
whether this is so, I want to pause on Professor Stephen Garvey's
work, Punishment as Atonement. 149 Tracing Anselm's work, Professor
Garvey considers how punishment as atonement would look if we
substitute the community for a Deity. 150 Professor Garvey also fiddles
with the traditional scheme of penance. In place of the four
interwoven steps of contrition of heart, confession of mouth,
satisfaction of deeds, and the infusion of grace, Professor Garvey
instead says that atonement consists of the two acts of expiation and
reconciliation. 51 The first involves repentance, apology, reparation
and penance by the offender; the second, forgiveness by the victim.
52
Though the language sounds medieval, what we have is two very
different, and indeed antithetical understandings of punishment.
First, for Professor Garvey and others who write of restorative
147. See Olson, supra note 27, at 152-154.
148. Both pulpit and Crown grumbled that "compassion" rendered justice void with the
juries acquitting far too many wrongdoers. Bernard W. McLane, Juror Attitudes Towards
Local Disorder: The Evidence of the 1328 Trailbaston Proceeding, in TWELVE MEN GOOD
AND TRUE 36 (.S. Cockburn & T. Green eds., 1988).
149. Garvey, supra note 121, at 1801.
150. Id. at 1803.
151. Id. at 1804.
152. Id. at 1804-05.
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justice, a central feature of sanction proper is reparation or
restitution. 53 What scholars unwittingly do is transform satisfaction
from an offering into the exacting of a debt.154 The language resounds
in tort law which aims to make the injured person whole again, to undo
the harm. 155  And though theorists speak of wrong as signifying a
breach in the communal bond, the focus-in the end-remains upon
wrongdoing as reflecting the harm done to the victim. This insistence
on criminal sanction being tied up with the repair of harm shares little
with medieval punishment.
Granted, the Anglo-Saxon had a complicated system of
monetary payments whereby a wrongdoer was to offer amends to his
adversary. But here an aspect of the folk law must be mentioned. It is
an aspect consistently overlooked by those who call on the medieval
example of compensation as support for reparation in the criminal law.
A passage from the eleventh century Leges Henrici Primi states "that
if anyone makes amends to another for his misdeed or makes good the
injury caused" and "offers an oath of reconciliation, it is commendable
of him to whom the offer is made if he gives back the whole thing.' 56
More than an empty maxim, the practices involved in making concord,
even after a judgment at an ordeal, aimed to ensure that no one left a
dispute empty handed and irrespective of whether the accuser had
made his case successfully against a wrongdoer. 15 7  Similarly, one
finds in the Anglo-Saxon period a duty offorgyf (forgiveness), when
a wrongdoer hands himself over to a wronged kin group member in
unabashed surrender.158 No doubt, the idea of either a civil plaintiff or
a victim to a crime returning what a wrongdoer offers seems absurd to
153. Id. at 1816-17.
154. This is a point Professor Meyer catches as she firmly tells us "no reparation, is no
reparation." Meyer, supra note 100, at 1527. Reparation would mean-if genuine-the
inflicting of what was given which would mean in its essence the demeaning and debasing of
the wrongdoer. This is, of course, another wrong which would require under a just desserts
theory, a demeaning of the one who now stands as the desecrator. The endless cycle of
vengeance begins...
155. See Frederick W. Gay, Restorative Justice and the Prosecutor, 27 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1651, 1652 (2000) ("This approach ... is more focused on reparation, restitution and
accountability with less emphasis on punishment alone. Restorative justice is much more
concerned about remedying harms than exacting punishment.").
156. LEGES HENRICI PRIMI, supra note 131, at ch.36.2, at 143.
157. See Green, supra note 77, at 84-85 (providing a detailed discussion of the pressure
to award the wrongdoer his offering back as well as a gift in twelfth and thirteenth century
England).
158. William Ian Miller, Choosing the Avenger: Some Aspects of the Blood Feud in
Medieval Iceland and England, 1 LAW & HIST. REv. 159, 202 (1983).
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us. Yet, before pausing upon the sense of that act to medieval
sanction, I want to suggest that the modem literature's insistence upon
reparation raises a suspicion that while a few scholars certainly wish to
rethink criminal sanction, much that is being thought is retribution
dressed up in new clothes.
This suspicion becomes keener when we turn to Professor
Garvey's condition that a wrongdoer undergo what he calls penance.'
59
Professor Meyer also implies the necessity of what amounts to a
penalty (though she does not say why it is necessary). What is not
being said, but hovers in between the lines of these reflections, is that
suffering must be inflicted upon the wrongdoer. Professor Meyer is
careful to speak in terms of "humane punishment," though she does
not detail what it looks like. 160 We might imagine here that humane
punishment means a community inflicting a little less suffering upon a
wrongdoer than it could. We do not rape the rapist. We incarcerate
him. Professor Garvey similarly turns to a modified form of
retribution that allows an account to be taken of a wrongdoer's
remorse. 16  He sees in the infliction of a penalty-suffering-a
message to the victim that annuls the false message the wrongdoer
"implicitly conveys through his wrongdoing, and of vindicating the
moral value and standing of his victim."' 62 Accomplishment, in part
depends upon the wrongdoer being made to feel "small" and
"diminished."'
163
At the outset, the inflicting of suffering upon a wrongdoer has
nothing to do with restoring honor to the one wronged. Ironically,
what scholars miss is the distorting, deeply wrenching, nature of
wrongdoing despite their attention on wrong's true character as a
rupturing of civic, and at times, personal trust. Insofar as a wrong
concretely degrades another, that stain cannot be washed away except
by two acts. One, the wrongdoer can actively show the victim-
through his honorable treatment of her over a course of time-her
honor. This, of course, can only be done in situations where the
wrongdoer and the one wronged have a personal relationship. Two, in
situations of impersonal wrong, the one wronged must rely on the
concrete acts of those around him. What is critical is not messages to
159. See Garvey, supra note 121, at 1819.
160. See Meyer, supra note 100, at 1527.
161. See Garvey, supra note 121, at 1825-26.
162. Id. at 1821.
163. Id. at 1822.
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the wrongdoer, but our deeds toward the one wronged. To return to
the example of the woman whose husband has beat her without mercy
over a course of time, her aplomb, sass, and sense of womanhood will
not return through like diminishing being exacted from the wrongdoer!
Her restoration takes more-the constant, affirming, concrete acts of
those around her which say she appears as, and thus is, one of dignity
and account. 
164
Moreover, a need to inflict suffering upon a wrongdoer is
precisely what the penitential teaching of the middle ages sought to
invert! The suffering that constituted punishment, or penance as
Professor Garvey calls it, was not externally inflicted upon a
wrongdoer. Instead, punishment denoted the distress that overcame a
penitent at having ripped himself from his union with another (and
from his god). 165 Insofar as others were concerned, to provide the
wrongdoer a way to expiate his anguish through practices such as
fasting or self-mortification was to offer a gift. 166 But atonement is
what it says-at-one-ment. For this to be, the injured person was to
forgive, and forego. In current literature, theorists insist upon a
distinction between forgiveness and mercy, equating the former to an
internal change in the way one feels toward a wrongdoer and the latter
as an affirmative act of mitigation of an otherwise required
suffering. 167  This distinction was not lost on the Middle Ages.
Nevertheless, until the twelfth century the penitential coloring of
sanction yielded an understanding of the import of affirmative
grace. 168 Not only was grace, as graciousness, important, it was a
necessary condition of sanction. Given that the wrongdoer's suffering
merely signified a gift, only by the grace of the injured would
reconciliation would take place.
Professor Garvey does not tussle with Anselm's musing on the
paradox of justice and grace. Professor Meyer does. She argues that
mercy is wrapped up in traditional punishment for we do not give the
wrongdoer his desserts. She notes that we do not torture the torturer,
164. Though beyond the scope of this essay, the above signals the problem with pity. See
Meyer, supra note 100, at 1534.
165. See Garvey, supra note 121, at 1819.
166. Professor Garvey acknowledges that the "best" penance is self-imposed, but he fails
to consider that there is not such quality as forced or inflicted penance. Garvey, supra note
121, at 1819.
167. See Meyer, supra note 100 at 1522-23 (discussing general modem debate).
168. See KOZIOL, supra note 36, at 217-219 (discussing import of concrete acts
of mercy and vengeance as making up the odd union ofjustice in eleventh century).
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beat up the bully, nor rape the rapist. 169 In a word, we do not seek to
demean the integrity of the wrongdoer in a way that matches the moral
harm done to the dignity of injured.170 I am not sure this is right. I
suspect, the literature's nearly blas6 acceptance that penalties must be
inflicted upon a wrongdoer bespeaks our unwillingness to quite let go
of our thirst for a bit of vengeance. And though cruel and unusual
punishment is prohibited under the Eighth Amendment, for anyone
familiar with, for example, the spiritual brutality of solitary
confinement in the new super maximum-security prisons, an argument
that we do not employ demeaning and assaultive means of punishment
(justified by a rational goal) becomes impossible to make.'7
What the contemporary discussion on punishment misses is
that a penitential understanding of sanction is not wrapped up with the
goals of punishment.' 72  Punishment is atonement: this is what the
medieval understood. Punishment is an act of the mutual suffering
into accord between two torn apart, be the one wronged a person or a
community. In the language of today's symposium, the moral and
obligatory character of punishment in the medieval period inhered in
that of which the act consisted: the struggle toward unity, and thus
toward the meaningful.
Insofar as the wrongdoer is concerned, his suffering bespeaks
his inner contrition and anguish. More than a feeling of guilt, this
anguish bespeaks the pain and misery of standing in a state of broken
trust with one's fellows.' 7 3 For the medieval this state of corruption
meant too that one stood in breach with the Divine itself insofar as
divinity denoted Union par excellance. Practice followed teaching.
Unlike theories of "atonement" put forth today, often contrition
sufficed to repair a breach between a wrongdoer and his adversary or
169. See Meyer, supra note 100, at 1527, 1530-31.
170. Id. at 1527.
171. See, e.g., Christine Rebman, The Eighth Amendment and Solitary Confinement: The
Gap in Protection From Psychological Consequences, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 567 (1999).
172. See Garvey, supra note 121, at 1806 ("Such theories combine, or fuse, teleological
and deontological insights inasmuch as they identify an end for punishment beyond
punishment itself but portray punishment as an "intrinsically appropriate (not just contingently
effective) means of pursuing that goal.").
173. See Michael E. Smith, Punishment in the Divine Comedy, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 533,
556 (1995) (explaining the idea in the context of Dante's work thusly: "[t]he damned also
enjoy a somewhat more substantial good. They have a persistent natural desire for the vision
of God, the true primal good. The thwarting of this desire is the main source of their pain.
But as in Paradise so even in Hell, God is present wherever he is desired. The damned have
an inkling of him.").
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community. The tears of the penitent cleansed and washed away the
stain upon his own dignity and through his humbling in prostration
before the person wronged removed the stain to his dignity. 74 To put
the idea slightly differently, for a wrongdoer to turn toward home in
his suffering as he stood, by his act, now homeless was punishment
proper. The wrongdoer's actions alone, however, did not comprise
punishment completed.
The completing of punishment necessitated the injured man's,
and in a little later period, the community's grace. Sanction proper,
that is penance, could not take place unless reunion occurred. Hence,
the medieval well understood that the injured man must give up his
need for redress! He must abandon his hope of inflicting suffering
upon the wrongdoer. Indeed, in direct contrast to Professor Stephen
Garvey who suggests that the injured person may rightly wait to
extend his forgiveness, 175 in the medieval world each moment of
failing to yield to the wrongdoer was a moment of punishment's lack.
Thus as late as Pope Innocent IV, church fathers taught of the
importance of not accusing one's brother and of tolerating those
wrongs done to us.176 Professor Koizol gives us the vivid picture of a
knight wronged by a miscreant, chasing him to his place of refuge, and
then laying prostrate before Saint Ursmari's relics gnawing and
gnashing his teeth as he writhed in pain at being asked by the saint to
give up his claim to redress. 177 In that the wronged person felt and
renounced his wrath, and hence his thirst to see the wrongdoer suffer,
he too experienced pain. The wronged man offered his wrath to the
wrongdoer.
None of the above is to say that satisfaction-amends-was
not important to the medieval period, but it was weighty only insofar
as it signified a manslayer's or thief s contrition. And that contrition,
can neither be compelled, as Maryland now does in requiring youthful
miscreants to apologize on hands and knees to their victims, 8 nor can
it be induced as one trains a dog.
174. See KOZIOL, supra note 36, at 182, 185-186.
175. See Garvey, supra note 121, at 1828.
176. See Richard M. Fraher, Preventing Crime in the High Middle Ages: The Medireview
Lawyers' Search for Deterrence, in POPES, TEACHERS, AND CANON LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES
215 (James Sweeney & Stanley Chodorow eds., 1989).
177. Geoffrey Koziol, Monks, Feuds, And The Making of Peace in Eleventh Century
Flanders, in THE PEACE OF GOD 251 (Thomas Head & Richard Landes eds., 1992).
178. See Dan M. Kahan, What do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591,
631-34 (1996).
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OF CLAIMING THE LAW
The medieval way may seem strange to us indeed. In this
mysterious world, a wronged man was encouraged in his loud and
wrathful assertion of what lay in store for his assailant and then urged
him to forego compensation. And the wrongdoer's penalty never
represented punishment but only the promise of a sacrificial offering:
punishment depended on a wrongdoer's heart alone. What allowed
this conciliatory system of sanctioning was its embeddedness within a
culture that knew criminal law as a manifestation of the myriad of
ethical ties that bound each-firmly-to another. But that knowledge
was itself rooted in centuries of belief that the meaningful, all that
bespoke the good or true, rested in an immanent unity. Hence, insofar
as one stretched toward the right, one did not reach for personal
vindication, but toward reunion. In a world where one saw the human
condition as a never-ending journey toward home, sanction could exist
not as an infliction of suffering upon a wrongdoer that may be
mitigated by mercy, but as a promise to not abandon-out of grace-
those who anguished in distress for want of the home they lost by their
wrongdoing. 179 Of course, behind all this stood the fusion of law and
morality.
V. CONCLUSION
I am not sure about all that our ancestors may have to say to us,
for we as a culture no longer believe that each law abiding action we
take toward each other ignites a spark of divinity by actualizing a Holy
Accord. Indeed, whether statesmen, stateswomen or judges may
appropriately rely on even a partial religious understanding in making
179. See Nonet, supra note 99, at 521, "Spirit takes the deed back in itself' (PG at 492;
Eng. trans. at 407), redeems it, by removing it from the element of existence and returning it to
the element of thought proper. Thus kept safe in thought, the past opens new and higher
possibilities for the self-revelation of spirit in existence (PG at 591; Eng. trans. at 492). Die
Er-innerung, the re-interiorization of the past in the truth of thought completes the absolution
of the self from its bondage to alien existence, in the restoration of its harmony with its inner
essence. As the fulfillment of this return, die Erinnerung is the at-one-ment of the self with
itself, in German die Versohnung, the return of the son to his filial belonging with the father,
that is, mortal man's unity with the godhead. In this return, the self rises again in its
Auferstehung, its resurrection to its proper identity with itself in the spirituality of selfhood.
Hence it is that the transformation of revenge into punishment accomplishes "the atonement of
the law with itself," as well as that "of the offender with himself," by which "the law is
restored," and "first known by the offender as his own," so that he "finds in it the peace of
justice" (GPR § 220).
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or defending positions and judgments has become an issue."' But it
seems there is something noble and beautiful in the thought that law
signifies our ethos, and that that ethos binds us to each other in a
heartfelt and meaningful way tying us both to our dead and to our
unborn in a way that lends intangible but nevertheless real sense and
significance to our lives.
And insofar as we wish a more humane kind of sentencing
scheme, one that takes account of contrition, or welcomes a wrongdoer
back in a meaningful way after punishment, the ethical and moral
content of the law is a necessary condition to those ends. We all
understand the idea of a homecoming. But home is not home simply
because we are biologically attached to certain people who live in a
house neutrally decorated in a no-one's kind of character. Rather,
home signifies certain smells, attitudes, customs and manners that we
embrace-it is the fact of our embracing these things that make us
yearn for home. This "me"-ness we sense in the law is nothing but our
common practices embodied into legal enactments much as we pour
hot liquid metal into a mold.
On the other hand, if breaking the criminal law only amounts to
a violation of a posited rule, which in turn is thought of as a neutral
and instrumental protection of unfettered personhood existing outside
culture-outside time and place-there is nothing profound about
disavowing that rule. The prohibition carries no weight by its very
claim to emptiness. Punishment, in turn, becomes only an exercise in
behavior modification much the way we train animals. Contrition
becomes unintelligible; and the notion of coming home, becomes
slightly grotesque.
180. Davison M. Douglas, Religion in the Public Square, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 647
(2001) (introductory remarks to symposium).
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